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The U.S. current account deficit continues its inexorable rise, set to hit US$900 billion 
this year. However, the steady rise in that deficit masks a change in its composition, with 
the growing surpluses of oil exporting countries, mirroring the increase in oil prices, now 
accounting for nearly half of the counterpart to the U.S. deficit. This paper will raise a 
number of issues related to this changing profile of the global imbalances and ask what 
implications they may hold for the adjustment process and for global capital flows, 
especially to the emerging market countries (EMCs).
2 On the adjustment process: 
 
   The (probably appropriate) caution of many of the oil exporting countries in 
increasing spending as oil revenues rise likely increases the burden of adjustment 
on the U.S.; and 
   Similarly, the decreasing share of U.S. exports in the slowly growing import 
basket of oil exporting countries means further pressure on the U.S. to correct its 
trade imbalance. 
These macroeconomic effects of the shifting profile of the U.S. deficit towards the oil 
exporters may also have implications for the ease with which the U.S. can fund both the  
current account deficit as well as its still sizeable fiscal deficits: 
 
   The investment preferences of the oil exporting countries appear to be quite 
different from those of the countries that recorded the counterpart surpluses in the 
earlier period of the growing U.S. deficit; 
                                                 
1 Jack Boorman is former Counsellor to the Managing Director and former Director of the Policy 
Development and Review Department, International Monetary Fund. Thanks are due to Krishna Srinivasan 
and Ivetta Hakobyan, both of the IMF, for their very helpful assistance with this paper. 
2 The definition of EMCs used in this paper includes Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, 
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Jordon, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, 
Uruguay, Venezuela, and Vietnam.     2  
   In particular, U.S. treasuries and other U.S. assets may be less attractive as a 
destination for the resources generated by the oil surpluses; 
   Deposits at international banks, as in earlier periods of oil exporter surpluses, 
appear relatively more attractive to these countries; 
   And, with increased deposit inflows, the banks may have sought new outlets for 
their lending, contributing to the change in global asset allocation. This appears to 
have led, inter alia, to a rapid rise in lending to selected EMCs, including in 
Eastern Europe. 
All of this has coincided with a broad based increase in the attractiveness of EMCs to 
foreign investors. This appears to have been driven by an underlying improvement in the 
fundamentals in many of these countries, but also by the long period of easy monetary 
conditions in much of the industrial world, and the consequent search for yield created by 
such policies. The result has been: 
   An increase in private capital flows to EMCs to record levels; 
   A shift in the composition of capital flows, with foreign direct investment (FDI) 
and commercial bank lending showing major gains; and 
   A change in the composition of FDI, with south-south flows, i.e., FDI from 
emerging market and developing countries to other countries within those groups, 
sustaining foreign investment even as FDI from industrial countries has declined. 
This development has been coincident with a scramble to secure natural 
resources—energy and other commodities—needed to feed the rapid growth of 
countries such as India, China, Brazil, and others. 
These latter developments raise questions about the sustainability of these capital flows: 
   Will the recent surge in bank lending end badly as it did in previous episodes of 
“recycling”? 
   Will equity investors in the EMCs maintain their commitments to those markets if 
yields elsewhere improve? and 
   Are there political and other risks associated with the increase in south-south FDI, 
at least that component driven by the scramble for natural resources? 
This paper will try to present evidence on some of the factors behind each of these 
changes in the global financial system and to speculate on their implications. 
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II. INTRODUCTION 
1.       A dominant factor in the international monetary and financial system over the 
last seven to eight years has been the almost continuous rise in the current account 
deficit in the balance of payments of the United States. From an average of about 
US$90 billion a year throughout much of the 1990’s, the deficit has increased almost 
every year from just over US$200 billion in 1998 to over US$800 billion in 2005 and, 
under current projections, will reach US$900 billion, or 6.5 percent of GDP, this year. 
2.       As the U.S. deficit has widened, there have been ongoing debates about the 
forces driving this phenomenon. Some analysts put the blame primarily on the U.S. 
fiscal deficit and on the 
low, and recently negative, 
household saving rate in 
the country. On the former, 
however, the link between 
fiscal and current account 
balances is rather weak 
across most developed 
countries, including the 
U.S. In particular, while the 
U.S. fiscal balance has 
moved from large deficits 
to surpluses and back over 
the past fifteen years, the 
current account balance has 
mostly been in a trend 
decline (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. United States: External Current Account Balance and Overall Fiscal 
Balance






















External current account balance Overall fiscal balance
Source: World Economic Outlook, International Monetary Fund.
3.       This lack of relationship between the U.S. budget deficit and the current 
account deficit is used by some to argue that global imbalances merely reflect the 
classic case of comparative advantage—emerging markets specialize in global 
manufacturing and commodity extraction while the U.S. specializes in global capital 
allocation. It is argued, therefore, that in the context of rapid growth, EMCs are 
providing bigger and bigger savings spillovers to the rest of the world and, thus, 
contributing to a widening U.S. current account deficit.
3  
4.       There is, no doubt, some validity to this view. However, with the U.S. deficits 
as large as they are, the global economy is in uncharted territory. The sustainability of 
both the current account deficit and the fiscal deficit depends on the willingness of 
foreigners to increase substantially their holdings of U.S. assets, including U.S. 
government securities, and the willingness of the U.S. to see greater foreign control 
                                                 
3 “Global Imbalances: Economic Myth and Political Reality: The U.S. Current Account Deficit, 16
th 
Century Spain and 21
st Century China,” Stephen King, HSBC Global Research, May 2006. 
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over those assets. But how realistic is this? The ever-widening current account deficit 
portends exchange rate adjustments that could produce substantial capital losses on 
such holdings. Similarly, the recent debate over direct investment in certain industries 
in the U.S., from China and Dubai, among others, at least raises questions about the 
welcome that some of the needed investment may receive in the U.S. Thus, the 
apparently benign historical relationship between the current account and the fiscal 
deficit should be of little comfort. 
5.       The increasing deficits in the U.S. current account appear to be much more 
closely related to the decline in the savings-investment balance of U.S. households   
(Figure 2). Many factors 
have been suggested as the 
cause for this decline, but 
surely one of the most 
important factors appears to 
be the impact of the housing 
boom, with capital gains 
being transformed into higher 
consumption (and higher 
imports). This then begs the 
question of whether 
monetary policy in the U.S. 
has helped perpetuate the 
global imbalances by being 
too lose for too long. There 
is, of course, an active, but 
unsettled, debate on the role 
that monetary policy should play in countering emerging asset bubbles. A related 
issue in this context concerns the implications for emerging market financing of the 
low interest rate environment in the U.S. (and in much of the industrial world) and the 
disposition of current account surpluses accumulating in the oil exporting countries.  
Figure 2. United States: External Current Account Balance and Net Household Savings 
















Current account balance Household savings minus residential investment
Source: World Economic Outlook, International Monetary Fund.
6.       Finally, some observers, in explaining the rise of the global imbalances, put 
emphasis on the “excessive” savings rates and the insufficiency of investment or of 
consumer spending in other parts of the world, especially in Asia, and to structural 
rigidities—including inflexible labor markets—in Europe. In both cases, the lower 
rates of growth in those parts of the world, or the bias toward export production that 
may exist, aggravate the U.S. current account deficit. 
7.       Obviously, there will need to be greater agreement on the relative importance 
of these forces, and the prospects going forward, if an effective multilateral policy 
response is to be crafted to foster an orderly adjustment to what is agreed by most 
observers to be an unsustainable situation. This is an issue well beyond this paper.
4  
                                                 
4This is the task recently charged to the IMF in the multilateral consultations that are now underway and 
that will be reported on at the IMF’s Annual Meetings in Singapore. The conclusions coming out of those 
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8.       But, there are other questions raised by these global imbalances that are also 
important for the workings of the international monetary and financial system that are 
as yet receiving less attention. In particular, the changing profile of the current 
account surpluses that are the counterpart to the U.S. deficit, and the related patterns 
of reserve accumulation by the surplus countries, appear to be giving rise to important 
changes in financial flows in the global economy, including flows to the emerging 
market countries.  
9.       The most important factor behind these changing patterns is, of course, the 
rise in oil prices over the past 
few years. Such price increases 
have exacerbated the U.S. trade 
and current account deficits, 
accounting for between one 
half and three fifths of the 
further deterioration that has 
taken place over the last few 
years.
5 At the same time, the 
higher oil prices have produced 
sharply higher current account 
surpluses in the oil exporting 
countries—which at around 
US$400 billion in 2005 
amounted to about half of the 
U.S. deficit of 
US$800 billion(Figure 3). The higher oil prices have also reduced the surpluses of 
other oil importing countries, including some countries in Asia in which the largest 
share of the counterpart to the U.S. deficits had been recorded and from which a large 
proportion of the U.S. fiscal deficit appears to have been financed.  
 
Figure 3. External Current Account Balance





















China Other Asian emerging countries 1/
Other emerging countries 2/ Oil exporting countries 3/
Source: World Economic Outlook, International Monetary Fund.
1/ Other emerging Asian countries include India, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam.
2/ Other emerging countries include Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Egypt, El Salvador, Hungary, Jordan, Morocco, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, 
Uruguay.
3/ Oil exporting countries include Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Indonesia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Mexico, 
Nigeria, Oman, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, Yemen.
10.       Against this background, this paper will examine three aspects of the changing 
profile of the global imbalances:  
i.  The implications of the growing surpluses and the spending patterns of the oil 
exporting countries for the global imbalances and for the burden on the U.S. 
to correct its current account deficit; 
ii.  The possible impact of the investment preferences of the oil exporting 
countries on global capital flows, including the ease with which the U.S. is 
able to finance its fiscal and current account deficits; and 
                                                                                                                                                  
discussions and the policy choices made thereafter will have important implications for the extent to which 
the needed adjustment in the global imbalances will be more or less orderly. 
5 World Economic Outlook (WEO), International Monetary Fund; and Fathom, “Who’s  Buying 
Treasuries?” May 16, 2006. 
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iii.  How the profile of capital flows to the emerging market countries is being 
affected by these and other recent developments. 
11.       Each of these issues will be taken up in the subsequent sections of this paper. 
It is important, however, to note that the examination of these issues is hindered by 
severe data problems. These problems will be identified and dealt with to the extent 
possible. But the data problems that remain temper the conclusions that can be drawn 
with confidence on these issues. 
III. SOME IMPLICATIONS OF THE SPENDING AND INVESTMENT PATTERNS OF OIL 
EXPORTERS FOR THE GLOBAL IMBALANCES 
12.       The large and growing surpluses of the oil exporting countries, even if they 
were only substituting for the earlier surpluses of some of the Asian and other 
emerging market countries, may have important implications for the prospects for 
global imbalances and the policy adjustments needed to address those imbalances. In 
particular, in the period 2001 (when oil prices began the rise that brought them to 
their current levels) through 2005, the U.S. current account deficit more than doubled 
from US$390 billion to US$805 billion while the surpluses of the oil exporting 
countries increased almost five-fold from US$72 billion to US$348 billion (Table 1). 
Over the same period, the current account surpluses of Asian countries increased 
from about US$120 billion to US$320 billion—more than accounted for by the rapid 
increase in the surpluses of Japan and, especially, China that offset the disappearance 
of the surpluses of other countries in the region. Elsewhere, the emerging market 
countries in Eastern Europe saw their current account balances deteriorate rather 
sharply over this period, while those of countries in other parts of the world actually 
improved, largely reflecting the boom in commodity prices. 
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13.       This pattern suggests that the U.S. (in contrast to many other countries, 
notably those in Asia) has been unable to tap into the higher import demand that 
oil producers have generated. This is reflected in the decline in imports from the 
U.S. as a share of the 
total imports of the o
exporting cou
Along with a more 
broad-based decline 
in the share of 
imports from the U.S. 
in total imports for 
several Asian 
countries since 1999 
(Figure 4), this has 
contributed to the 
continued worsening 
of the U.S. current 
account balance. In 
the context of a 
long-term decline in the oil exporters’ marginal propensity to import (Table 2), the 
declining share of 
imports from the U.S. 
in their total imports 
has reduced the offset 
to higher oil prices in 
the trade balance of 
the U.S. To the extent 
that imports have 
been redirected to 
Europe and 
elsewhere, growth in 
those areas would be 
increased with 
positive implications 
for U.S. exports. But, 
that impact, too, has 
been limited as the 
overall propensity of the oil exporting countries to import has declined. The net 
effect then would seem to suggest a more difficult process of adjustment for the 
U.S. than would otherwise be the case.  
Figure 4. Imports from United States
















China Japan Other Asian countries 1/ Oil exporters 2/
Source: Direction of Trade Statistics, International Monetary Fund.
1/ Other Asian countries include India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and South Korea.
2/ Oil exporters include Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea,  Gabon,  Indonesia, Iran, Iraq,  Kazakhstan, 




GCC states 0.34 0.25 0.15
OPEC 0.52 0.42 0.24
Russia 1.37 1.08 0.2
Norway ... -0.3 -0.13
Source: International Monetary Fund.
1/ Change in imports (net of non-oil exports) + investment income as
percent change in oil export revenues.
Table 2. Marginal Propensity to Import 1/
14.       More generally, the oil exporters appear to be more cautious in judging the 
permanence of the recent price increases, not least, perhaps, because of the 
unhappy experiences in earlier episodes wherein they expanded spending too 
rapidly, could not reverse that spending quickly, and suffered large fiscal and 
current account deficits and painful adjustment. This behavior, in particular, is 
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likely to further affect adversely the U.S. current account balance, and the impact 
could be substantial. 
15.       For example, the cumulative current account surplus of oil exporters in the 
Middle East and Central Asia
6 during 2003–05 was US$400 billion. During the 




US$360 billion at 
end–2005. An 
additional 
US$200 billion or 
more was registered 
in “other asset 
accumulation” in the 
official sector
7  
(Table 3). Similarly, 
the governments of 
oil exporting 
countries in the 
Middle East and 
Central Asia saved, 
on average, three-
quarters of the increase in oil revenue accruing to their budgets since 2002,
8 while  
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Projections
Current account balance 156.6 92.6 75.2 132.5 220.6 397.0 480.9
External financing 78.0 35.8 52.4 81.5 129.6 148.8 139.1
From official sector 5.7 -10.6 -20.7 -1.9 -9.9 -36.8 -11.9
From private sector 72.3 46.4 73.1 83.4 139.4 185.6 151.0
FDI 37.4 51.9 39.3 49.6 70.6 72.8 80.6
Portfolio equity -0.4 -0.2 -0.1 -0.9 -4.4 2.3 -0.8
Bonds -4.7 -0.3 -0.5 8.0 27.1 40.4 7.8
Bank loans -2.3 -0.9 -5.6 -2.6 -2.8 -2.8 -0.9
Suppliers' credit and others 42.2 -4.1 40.0 29.3 49.0 72.9 64.3
External Asset Accumulation 234.6 128.4 127.6 214.0 350.2 545.8 620.0
By official sector, reserves 73.8 33.1 26.1 77.3 129.7 210.8 197.8
By official sector, other 44.2 22.5 8.7 66.9 105.0 124.5 202.3
By private sector, FDI 14.7 6.3 10.2 13.5 22.9 45.3 46.9
By private sector, other 102.0 66.5 82.7 56.3 92.5 165.1 173.0
Source: WEO.
1/ Oil exporting countries from the Middle East and Central Asia region including Algeria, Azerbaijan, 
Bahrain, Iran,Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkmenistan, and 
the United Arab Emirates.
Table 3. Oil Exporting Countries: Current Account Balance and External Financing 1/
(In billions of U.S. Dollars)
                                                 
6 Oil exporters from the Middle East and Central Asia region include Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Iran, 
Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkmenistan, and the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE). These oil exporters have witnessed particularly rapid increases in their current account 
balances, official reserves, and in other asset accumulation in the official sector. 
7 Regional Economic Outlook, Middle East and Central Asia, May 2006 and the WEO. This is a murky 
area, but “other asset accumulation” is believed to include oil stabilization funds, so-called funds for future 
generations, and the like. 
8 Measured as the ratio of the increase in the fiscal balance to the increase in the government’s oil revenues. 
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government spending as a share of GDP has declined.
9 As a result, the overall 
fiscal position of these countries changed from broad balance in 2002 to a surplus 
of 12 percent of GDP in 2005 
(Figure 5).  
Figure 5. Oil Exporting Countries from the Middle East and Central Asia: Overall Fiscal Balance and 
Public Spendings 1/


























Overall fiscal balance Public Spendings
Source: World Economic Outlook.
1/ Oil exporting countries from the Middle East and Central Asia including Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, 














16.       The corollary to the 
changing pattern of current 
account surpluses from some 
of the Asian countries and 
other non-oil exporting 
emerging market countries to 
the oil exporters (Figure 6) is 
the changing pattern in the 
disposition of accumulating 
official international reserves 
(Figure 7).
10 This, too, could 
have implications for the 
adjustment process. Asian 
and other surplus countries 
rather reliably bought U.S. 
securities, helping to finance 
Figure 6. External Current Account Balance



















Eastern European emerging market countries 2/ Other emerging market countries 3/
Oil exporting countries 4/
Source: World Economic Outlook, International Monetary Fund.
1/ Other emerging Asian countries include India, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam.
2/ Eastern European emerging market countries include Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Turkey, Ukraine.
3/ Other emerging countries include Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Jordan, Morocco, 
Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, South Africa, Tunisia, Uruguay.
4/ Oil exporting countries include Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Indonesia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Mexico, 
Nigeria, Oman, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, Yemen.
                                                 
9 In this context, it should be noted that policy advice from the IMF has underscored the importance of 
increasing spending on projects with high returns, particularly infrastructure, including with a view to help 
reduce global imbalances. 
10As noted, estimates of oil exporters’ foreign exchange reserves do not generally give a full and fair 
account of the current account surpluses that are accruing. This is because, while they include accruals to 
formal central bank reserves, they do not include increased holdings in oil stabilization or investment funds 
or accounts of other official agencies or institutions. 
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the U.S. current account deficit (without significant depreciation of the dollar) and 
the fiscal deficit (without significant increases in U.S. interest rates). In the current 
environment, both 
economic and political, it 
is not clear that oil 
exporting countries are 
similarly attracted to that 
option.  
Figure 7. Gross International Reserves

























Other Asian countries 1/ Oil exporters 2/
Oth i k t t i 3/
Source: World Economic Outlook.
1/ Other Asian countries include India, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and South Korea.
2/ Oil exporters include Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea,  Gabon,  Indonesia, Iran, Iraq,  Kazakhstan, 
Kuwait, Libya, Mexico, Nigeria, Oman, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, and Yemen.
3/ Other emerging countries include Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Hungary, Jordan, Morocco, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, South Africa, 







17.       Major data problems confront the analysis of these changing patterns, but 
some conclusions, albeit tentative, can be drawn. The commonly used source of 
information on official holdings of short-term U.S. treasury securities by country 
is the so-called TIC data 
collected by the U.S. 
treasury. Those data are 
presented in for some 
individual countries and 
some groups of countries 
(Figure 8). One thing 
immediately evident is 
that the substantial 
increase in current 
account surpluses of the 
oil exporters is not 
mirrored in the 
accumulation of U.S. 
treasury securities by 
those countries. That said, however, these data appear suspect. 
Figure 8. Major Foreign Holders of Treasury Securities 



















































China Japan United Kingdom
Other Asian countries 1/ Other developed countries 2/ Other developing countries 3/
Oil exporters 4/ Other countries 
Source: Department of the Treasury, Federal Reserve Board (www.treas.gov/tic), 7/6/2006.
1/ Other Asian countries include Hong Kong, India, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand.
2/ Other developed countries include Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland.
3/ Other developing countries include Bahamas, Bermuda, Brazil, Cayman Islands, Mexico, Netherlands Antilles, Panama, Poland, and Turkey.
4/ Oil exporters include Ecuador, Venezuela, Indonesia, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Algeria, Gabon, 
Libya, and Nigeria.
18.       In particular, Japanese and Chinese holdings of U.S. treasury securities 
rise rapidly in the early years of the emerging U.S. (fiscal and current account) 
deficits but then remain flat after 2004. The patterns for some of the other country 
groupings look reasonable and correlate well with other data. However, the 
pattern for the U.K., which registers a surprisingly large accumulation of U.S. 
securities in recent years, and for the oil exporters, which registers only a very 
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modest increase in the face of rapidly increasing surpluses, raise significant 
questions.  
19.       At least two problems surface in reviewing these data. First, the coverage 
is too narrow. For example, the flattening of Chinese holdings of short-term U.S. 
treasuries appears to coincide with a shifting preference on the part of the Chinese 
away from increasing such holdings toward higher yielding and longer maturity 
securities, including mortgage-backed and other U.S. agency securities not 
included in these data.
11 Second, the data do not track well the holdings of 
securities registered in individual country data and are challenged by anecdotal 
evidence. Taking such data at face value also raises questions about how much of 
the U.S. fiscal deficit has effectively been financed by official—as opposed to 
private—sources from overseas. Some have speculated that the continued funding 
of the U.S. deficit with little pressure on interest rates suggested that private 
investors overseas were stepping in as official purchases leveled off. This 
argument was bolstered by the high level of purchases by U.K. entities. However, 
this interpretation may have overstated the appetite of private investors overseas 
for acquiring U.S. assets.  
20.       More recently, data have become available based on a new custody survey 
which shows the ultimate owner of securities. These custodial data show that in 
the 12 months through June 2005, for example, official purchases of U.S. 
treasuries amounted to US$339 billion. This is significantly higher than data from 
the TIC series, which indicated that official buying of U.S. securities over the 
same period amounted to only US$162 billion. The custodial data appear to 
explain most of the discrepancy between reported official reserve accumulations 
by individual countries and the accumulated monthly TIC data. 
21.       At the same time, while the custodial data show much higher levels of 
official accumulation of U.S. assets, the broad total of foreign investment in U.S. 
securities is roughly comparable in the two sets of data. The higher levels of 
official investment in the custodial data were offset by lower private investment 
when compared with the accumulated monthly flows. Also, foreign investment in 
highly liquid instruments, including treasury securities, is lower in the custodial 
data in favor of less liquid bonds (including mortgage backed securities and 
corporate bonds). The new data would also seem to solve the mystery behind the 
large increase in holdings of U.S. securities by private parties in the U.K. In fact, 
analysts suggest that these probably reflect holdings by official agencies, most 
likely of the oil exporters in the Middle East, purchased through London dealers. 
This may be an example of a more pervasive problem in interpreting these data on 
the allocation of reserve holdings. Some countries have outsourced reserve 
management to specialized institutions, resulting in the securities held being 
recorded as belonging to those institutions. 
                                                 
11 Global Financial Stability Report, World Bank, April, 2006. 
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22.       In short, the custodial data appear to give a more accurate picture of U.S. 
securities accumulation by foreign official holders. But they do not provide 
anything like a complete 
picture of the disposition 
of reserves by the oil 
exporting countries. BIS 
data help here. These data 
show a significant rise in 
oil exporters’ deposits in 
BIS-reporting banks 
roughly coincident with 
the sharp rise in oil prices 
(Figure 9). This would 
seem to suggest a 
similarity between this 
and the earlier episodes 
of rapidly rising oil 
prices. During the earlier 
episodes of major 
increases in the price of oil, particularly in the 1970’s, a large portion of the 
reserves of the oil exporters took the form of bank deposits that were then 
“recycled” as bank lending, much of it to emerging and developing economies, 
especially in Latin America. This is the familiar story of the prelude to the debt 
crisis of the 1980’s. 
Figure 9. Gross External Loans and Deposits of BIS Reporting Banks and Oil Prices






















































































































































































































































































Claims of BIS-reporting banks on emerging market countries, left scale
Deposits of oil exporting countries in BIS-reporting banks, left scale
Crude oil average price, US dollars per barrel, right scale
Source: Bank for International Settlements, International Financial Statistics.
23.       This time around, 
however, the evidence is 
not conclusive. On the one 
hand, the net liabilities 
(deposits minus lending) 
of BIS-reporting banks 
accruing to the oil 
exporting countries  has 
increased rapidly in recent 
years (Figure 10)—indeed 
the increase in deposits of 
oil exporting countries in 
BIS-reporting banks 
accounts for more than 
50 percent of their total 
reserve accumulation 
Figure 10. Net External Loans and Deposits of BIS Reporting Banks



















































































































































































































































































Net liabilities of BIS-reporting banks accruing to oil exporting countries
Net claims of BIS-reporting banks on United States 
Net claims of BIS-reporting banks on United Kingdom 
Net claims of BIS-reporting banks on Asian emerging market countries, excluding Indonesia
Net claims of BIS-reporting banks on emerging market countries in Eastern Europe 1/
Net claims of BIS-reporting banks on other emerging market countries
Source: Bank for International Settlements.
1/ Emerging market countries in Eastern Europe include Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Turkey, Ukraine.
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during 2001 through 2005.
12 On the other hand, net claims (lending minus 
deposits) of BIS-reporting banks to the entire group of emerging market countries 
appears to remain almost flat. At the same time, however, lending by BIS-
reporting banks to a selected group of EMCs, particularly in Eastern Europe, has 
increased sharply over the same time frame. Furthermore, it is possible that the 
rapid rise in net claims of BIS-reporting banks on the United Kingdom is 
indicative of institutions in that country being a conduit for oil exporters to secure 
greater exposure to EMCs.  
 
24.       To summarize, the U.S. current account balance is likely to worsen further 
and the adjustment process made even more difficult as a result of the combined 
impact of the increase in oil prices and the relative decline in the propensity of oil 
exporters to import from the U.S. This is further aggravated by the caution of most 
oil exporters in increasing overall spending, including on imports. This, then, 
raises questions as to whether the financing of the U.S. current account balance 
and the U.S. fiscal deficit will continue unabated without an increase in U.S. 
interest rates, notably because of the changing pattern in the accumulation of 
official reserves and the lower proclivity of oil exporters to hold their assets in the 
form of U.S. treasury securities. The boom in equity markets in many of the 
emerging market countries, as well as the sharp rise in real estate prices in some of 
those countries, may also be related both to the flow of resources from the oil 
exporting countries through the banks, as well as to direct purchases by entities 
within the oil exporting countries.  
25.       Moreover, to the extent that oil exporters (and EMCs) are more inclined to 
use their reserves to purchase real assets by acquiring equity stakes through FDI, 
for example, it would be highly problematic for the unwinding of global 
imbalances if advanced economies, notably the U.S., were to succumb to 
pressures of economic nationalism and limit access to real assets. For purposes of 
diversification, oil exporters and emerging market creditors will want to invest in 
assets other than government or corporate debt, such as “south-north” FDI. If that 
is not politically feasible in the U.S. on the scale required, oil exporters and EMCs 
are likely to explore other mature markets and also pursue greater “south-south” 
FDI. It is to the changing world of capital flows to EMCs that we now turn. 
IV. CAPITAL FLOWS TO EMERGING MARKET COUNTRIES 
A.   Recent Trends in Overall Capital Flows 
26.       A by-product of the low interest rate environment, and generous liquidity 
conditions, in the U.S. (and most of the industrial world) and, more recently, of 
                                                 
12 The remainder has likely taken the form of greater holdings of U.S. treasury and agency securities, 
including through dealers in the U.K. (as noted above), a variety of other investments, including in regional 
equity markets, and debt repayments. 
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the rapid asset accumulation of oil exporters, has been a rapid rise in private 
capital flows to EMCs over the past several years.  
   Private 
capital flows 










debt flows in 
the years 
following the 
Asian crisis, more recently, debt flows have been increasing rapidly, 
coincident with the rise in oil prices and the growing surpluses of the oil 
exporting 
countries. 
(Figure 12).  
Figure 11. Total Capital Flows to Emerging Market Countries, 1990-2004


















Total capital flows Total equity flows Total private debt flows Total official debt flows
Source: Global Development Finance, World Bank.
   Net bond 
issuance is 
only a small 




inter alia, that 
the 
vulnerability 
of EMCs to 
market 
sentiment has 
been reduced, and access of many EMCs to international capital markets 
could close without significant immediate effects on the balance of 
payments. The potential near-term vulnerability of these countries appears 
to have been further reduced through the significant prefinancing that has 
been arranged. In addition, EMCs have made large debt payments to the 
official sector in the past two years, including to the international financial 
institutions and official bilateral creditors, especially the IMF and the Paris 
Club. This presumably implies increased access to such financing, 
Figure 12. Total Capital Flows to Emerging Market Countries, 1990-2004
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Total equity flows Total private debt flows Total official debt flows
Source: Global Development Finance, World Bank.
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especially from the IMF, should conditions in the global economy become 
less benign. 
27.       The rapid rise in capital flows to EMCs, driven, inter alia, by the quest for 
yield and the windfall gains associated with the rise in oil prices, has been 
supported by fundamental improvements in many of these countries. In particular: 
   Since the Asian crisis, many EMCs have strengthened macroeconomic 
policy frameworks and improved their assessment and management of 
vulnerabilities. Moves toward more flexible exchange rate regimes, 
strengthened surveillance over financial systems, including in the context 
of efforts led by the official sector (FSAPs and FSSAs), improved 
understanding of balance sheet interlinkages, and the rapid accumulation 
of foreign exchange reserves have contributed to making economies more 
robust and less vulnerable to crises. 
   Fiscal management and overall fiscal performance has improved 
substantially in 
many EMCs 
(Figure 13).  













provision and greater transparency. At the same time, regulation and 
supervision of financial sectors—and the assessment thereof—have 
improved markedly in many countries. These changes may be among the 
most important achievements of the initiatives taken to improve the 
international financial architecture that began in the wake of the Mexican 





















Overall fiscal balance (in percent of GDP), left scale Total international reserves (in billions of U.S. dollars), right scale
Source: World Economic Outlook, International Monetary Fund.
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28.       Collectively, 
these developments 
have improved the 
credit ratings of EMCs 
and compressed their 
sovereign spreads 
(Figure 14), which, 
together with low 
global interest rates, 
have helped reduce 
their debt and debt-
service burdens 
(Figure 15). 
Capitalizing on these 
favorable trends, many 
EMCs have improved 
their overall debt 
management o
and capacity with a 
view to reducing 
exchange rate, interest 
rate, and rollover risks.  
Figure 14. Number of Sovereign Upgrades/Downgrades and JP Morgan Emerging Market Global Sovereign Spread
 1990-2005 1/ 2/










































Rating/Outlook Upgrades Rating/Outlook Downgrades JP Morgan Emerging Market Global Sovereign Spread (right scale)
Source: Bloomberg.
1/ EMBIG countries and Czech Republic, Estonia, India, Jamaica, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia.
2/ Long Term Foreign Currency.
Figure 15. Emerging Market Countries: External Debt and Debt Services
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Source: World Economic Outlook, International Monetary Fund.
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29.       In particular, sovereign debt as a share of GDP for a large (albeit not 
exhaustive) sub-group of EMCs has declined from 44 percent in 2002 to 
39 percent in 2004 (but this is still higher than the pre-Asian crisis level of 
27 percent).
13 Similarly, based largely on experiences gained from previous crises, 
EMCs have actively sought to reduce exposure to foreign exchange risk, notably 
by retiring/repaying international bonds and increasing issuance of domestic 
currency debt. As a result, for the sub-group of EMCs, external debt has declined 
to 10 percent of GDP after peaking at 16 percent in 1999. At the same time, the 
share of local-currency denominated bonds in marketable sovereign debt of EMCs 
in the sample increased by 9 percentage points between 1996 and 2004, to around 
82 percent. Furthermore, the maturity of EMCs’ sovereign debt issues has 
increased in recent years. While international issuance has typically been in the 
form of fixed-rate medium-term bonds, the average maturity of international 
issuance by the EMCs in the sample has increased further to 13 years in 2005 
from about eight years in 2001.  
30.       These positive developments notwithstanding, it needs to be noted that 
benign external conditions may mask underlying balance sheet vulnerabilities. 
The recent turbulence in the equity markets, first in early-May and subsequently 
in June, has been a reminder on this score. The associated sell-off in EMCs 
appears mainly to have reflected an adjustment in the pricing of risk, not a 
wholesale reassessment of the fundamentals in these countries. In particular, in the 
first phase of the recent correction in markets, EMCs with significant investment 
flows and valuation gains, and local markets with concentrated foreign investors’ 
positions, corrected strongly; however, in the second phase of the correction, some 
EMCs with better fundamentals suffered much less than those with weak 
fundamentals. In particular, EMCs with large current account deficits, reflecting 
domestic consumption-led growth, that were financed by portfolio inflows, were 
the most seriously affected.  
31.       Clearly some EMCs may be at risk. A number of countries in Eastern 
Europe, including the Baltic countries, have relatively large—and, in some cases, 
worsening—external imbalances that appear to be driven primarily by rapid credit 
growth to the private sector (a development characteristic of some of the countries 
in East Asia before the crisis of 1997). A few of these countries also have large 
fiscal deficits and have built up large short-term external debt positions, most of it 
in foreign currency, and large net international investment liabilities. A key 
question here is whether these developments have made these countries vulnerable 
to sudden stops in the flow of foreign capital. It is worth remembering that before 
the Asian crisis, some of the countries most seriously affected—like many of 
those currently in Eastern Europe—enjoyed good credit ratings, which then 
dropped sharply as foreign capital flows reversed.  
                                                 
13 See Global Financial Stability Report, International Monetary Fund, April 2006. 
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32.       Going forward, external risks—including an abrupt or unexpected rise in 
global interest rates, supply side shocks to the oil markets, or a disorderly 
unwinding of global current account imbalances—could prove challenging. In the 
face of such developments, investors may increasingly differentiate among EMCs. 
In particular, as external financial conditions become less benign, EMCs with 
macroeconomic imbalances and that still rely heavily on eternal financing face a 
narrower margin for policy slippages. Similarly, EMCs that still have sizeable 
vulnerabilities in the fiscal position and/or public sector balance sheets are more 
susceptible to pressures in their external accounts and to crises more generally.  
33.       In addition, policy makers in both mature markets and in EMCs face 
renewed challenges. Central banks need to communicate effectively to financial 
markets their assessment of inflation risks and their resolve to contain inflation. 
Moreover, supervisors and financial institutions need to redouble their efforts to 
monitor and manage risk, especially counterparty risk vis-à-vis hedge funds and 
those selling credit default swaps. Active debt management policies should 
continue as part of an overall plan to develop and strengthen local capital markets 
and deepen the institutional base.  
B.   Foreign Direct Investment in Developing and Emerging Market Countries 
34.       Notwithstanding the ever-present risks, most of the recent trends in 
emerging market financing are clearly welcome. They have improved the 
attractiveness of EMCs as an asset class, and have helped broaden the investor 
base toward more dedicated and longer-term investors. This is best reflected in the 
dramatic increase in FDI inflows to EMCs. In particular: 
   FDI flows to EMCs have increased more than ten-fold from a modest 
US$20 billion in 1990 to more about US$237 billion in 2005. This trend, 
however, masks the sharp decline FDI flows to EMCs in the period 
following the Asian crises through 2003 and the equally dramatic rebound 
in 2004 and 2005.  
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   The increase in FDI flows to EMCs from US$162 billion in 2003 to 
US$237 billion in 2005 was part of the global increase in FDI to          
US$959 billion in 2005. However, the more noteworthy element in this 
context is that FDI (as well as capital flows more generally) between 
EMCs—south-south flows—are growing more rapidly than north/south 
FDI. 
   Along with 
the increase in 
FDI, there has 
been a surge 
in external 
flows into the 
equity markets 





rise in market 
indices since 
the late 1990’s (Figure 16).  
























South Korea Stock Market Index India Stock Market Index South Africa Stock Market Index Tunisia Stock market Index
Source: Bloomberg.
35.       A number of factors underpin the overall expansion of FDI, and equity 
flows more generally, into EMCs. These include the continued robust global 
economic growth and its offshoot in the commodity price boom; strong corporate 
profits in EMCs and the consequent reinvestment of a large proportion of those 
profits in the host country; the changing nature of the multinational corporation 
from home-country centric to what some call “the globally integrated enterprise” 
(reflected, for example, in the greater willingness of multi-national companies to 
fund R&D in subsidiaries in the EMCs);
14 the much improved macroeconomic 
climate in many of the EMCs; and the generally improved investment climate. 
These positive developments have been complemented by significant financial 
innovations, including structured financial instruments, such as credit default 
swaps and other derivatives, that have facilitated the management of risk exposure 
in the EMCs; the development of local financial markets that have created a 
synergy with FDI inflows; increased privatization and cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions; and the ongoing scramble for natural resources. 
36.       Notwithstanding the rapid increase in FDI flows to EMCs, there remains a 
significant concentration of flows to the top ten recipient countries, which account 
for about 65 percent of total FDI flows to EMCs (less than the 75 percent of the 
                                                 
14 Palmisano (IBM). 
    21  
late 1990’s). While East Asia and the Pacific remain the largest regional 
destination for FDI, both Latin America and, even more so, the developing and 
emerging countries of Europe and Central Asia have seen a surge in FDI inflows, 
in the latter from about US$30 billion earlier in this decade to over US$75 billion 
in 2005. The Middle East, South Asia, and Africa continue to attract only a 
modest share (about 15 percent of the total), but that share has increased by over 
50 percent since 2000 and looks set to increase further.  
37.       As noted, an important feature of recent developments is the rapid increase 
in “south-south” FDI flows. It is, however, important to underscore that the 
paucity of data, and its imprecision, limits the extent to which the trends, and the 
factors behind them, can be precisely identified. The 2006 Global Development 
Finance Report does a good job in gathering information from numerous sources 
to try to describe recent developments in this area.
15   
   South-south FDI flows increased from US$14 billion in 1995 to 
US$47 billion in 2003, partly offsetting the decline in north/south FDI 
(from US$130 billion in 1999 to US$82 billion in 2003), and raising the 
share of south-south FDI in total FDI to developing countries from 16 
percent to 36 percent over that period.
16 These flows easily dominate both 
syndicated bank lending and cross border equity listings between 
developing countries.  
   These changes are driven by many of the same factors that have led to 
closer integration across much of the globe in the last decade.
17 For 
example, the majority of developing countries—led by the EMCs—has 
become more open to foreign investment over the past 10 years. But these 
changes also reflect the increasing share of world trade that takes place 
between developing countries (up from 15 percent to 26 percent of total 
world trade between 1991 and 2004) and the even more rapid growth of 
trade between developing countries within the same region–spurred, in 
part, by the explosion in regional trade arrangements.
18 The evidence 
suggests that FDI follows, or at least runs parallel with, trade.
19  
                                                 
15 As data are scarce, the report calculates south-south FDI as a residual, subtracting FDI outflows from 
high income to developing countries from total FDI inflows to developing countries. 
16 Paucity of data does not enable a further disaggregation to analyze South-South FDI flows, although the 
bulk of the flows appear to be to EMCs. 
17 By one measure, the vast majority of developing countries—76 out of a total of 84 rated developing 
countries—have become more open to FDI, both inward and outward flows, in the past 10 years. 
18 From 2000 to 2004, south-south trade grew at an annual rate of 17.6 percent, faster than south/north and 
north/south exports (12.6 percent and 9.7 percent, respectively (GDFR, 2006)). 
19 By way of example, while 30 percent of all FDI in telecommunications in developing countries was       
south-south, more than 85 percent of that was inter-regional. 
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   It is also likely that, as the 2006 Global Development Finance Report 
notes, “Developing country multinationals enjoy some advantages over 
industrial country firms when investing in developing countries because of 
their greater familiarity with technology and business practices suitable for 
developing-country markets.” In fact, the forces driving south-south FDI 
appear sufficiently powerful to overcome the greater impediments 
sometimes faced by developing country multinationals in their home 
country, including bureaucratic and financial constraints on outward 
investment.  
38.       While south-south FDI has increased rapidly in recent years, it has, like 
FDI more broadly, remained fairly highly concentrated among a group of 
countries that account for the bulk of such flows. Moreover, it has generally been 
the case that south-south FDI tends to be between developing countries within the 
same region. More recently, however, China, India, and some other developing 
countries are breaking this mold as the search for natural resources becomes a 
more and more important motivation for FDI. In 2004, for example, fully one-half 
of China’s outward FDI was directed towards natural resource projects in Latin 
America. In China, and increasingly in other developing countries, these results 
are being driven, in part, by the increasing role played by state enterprises, or by 
inducements provided by export-import banks and various subsidy mechanisms, 
in the search for natural resources. As the search for oil and for resources in the 
non-oil mining sectors increases, this broadening of south-south FDI beyond the 
usual regional constraints is likely to continue, further increasing the competition 
by investors in these sectors. Moreover, countries that are significant oil and gas 
producers are investing heavily in other developing countries as they integrate 
their downstream operations such as refining, distribution, and retailing. 
V. ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION 
39.       The changed profile of capital flows, induced in part by the investment 
preferences of the oil exporting countries, and by their apparent caution in 
increasing spending in pace with the higher oil revenues, poses a number of 
critical questions: 
   Will the ability of the U.S. to finance its fiscal deficit with only modest 
changes in interest rates and in the exchange rate of the dollar be 
compromised by the apparent investment preferences of oil exporters? 
   Has the adjustment required to reduce the U.S. current account deficit been 
made more difficult? Has this increased the possibility of a hard landing in 
the global economy? 
40.       The emerging pattern of capital flows in the global economy, including the 
substantial increase in flows through the international banks, raises the specter of 
a repeat of the problems that developed in the wake of the recycling of the 1970’s 
or the crises in East Asia following the credit boom of the mid-1990’s. For sure, 
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the fundamentals in many of the EMCs appear much stronger now than was the 
case during those earlier periods but there are regions that look vulnerable, 
including Eastern Europe, and there are risks that may be little understood, 
especially from the exploding use of new and innovative financial instruments. 
   Should these developments be viewed with concern? 
   Are the monitoring mechanisms in place sufficient to encourage better risk 
analysis than was the case in earlier periods? 
   Again, are there elements in these developments that could increase the 
possibility of a hard landing if the needed adjustments to the underlying 
imbalances are not made quickly and in an orderly manner?  
41.       While the increased flows of FDI to EMCs, including the rapid growth of 
south-south flows, are to be welcomed from many perspectives, the possible risks 
in these developments should not be ignored. 
   Are there political/strategic risks from the increasing competition to secure 
natural resources? For example, will the kind of tensions and competition 
that was seen between the U.S.—or the West, more generally—and the 
former Soviet Union, which gave rise to so much proxy conflict in Africa, 
arise again as the countries seeking natural resource supplies confront each 
other in the (oil and non-oil) resource-rich states? 
   Are there risks to the initiatives of recent years to pressure developing and 
emerging market countries to improve their governance? For example, 
does Angola care any more about this pressure—if it ever did—when 
China alone has loaned the country US$3 billion in just the last two years, 
and as most oil companies continue to resist calls for greater transparency 
in their operations in these countries? 
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